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B.

FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEVELOPERS.

One

of the most

important

disputed

factual

issues

raised by the Developers' own brief was when they learned of
the

pipeline,

authorized

either

personally,

or

to develop the property.-7

through

their

agents

While the Developers

claim that they didn't personally learn of the pipeline until
February, 1983, Stephen Keil, their partner, knew of it in
September, 1979.

See, Tr. 229-232, 235, 256, 264, 330-333;

Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 15, 22.

The engineers that the

Developers hired to plan the development of the property also
knew of the pipeline before the December, 1979 sale by the
Combes.

See, Addendum A to the Combes' opening brief.
From

plan

drawings

the beginning, these engineers
around

the

pipeline,

which

assumed to include a 30 foot wide easement.
The disclosure of the easement

configured
they

the

accurately

See, Tr. 249-264.

in the real estate contract

would have told the Developers and their engineers no more
about the potential development problems than they already knew

±/

The Developers' allegations that the Combes knew
of the pipeline prior to the sale to the Developers are also
disputed, and no such finding was ever made by the district
court. See, n. 5, infra.
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at the time.

If the Developers' agents did not in fact inform

the Developers of the pipeline, then the Developers' claim is
against their agents, not the Combes.
The Developers admit personal knowledge of the pipeline as of February, 1983.

This raises other inherently fac-

tual issues not addressed by the trial court.

Did the Devel-

opers wait an unreasonable amount of time (18 months) before
asserting

their

rescission

claims?

Were

their

words

and

actions, or those of their agents, during this period, inconsistent with rescission?
The

Developers

mischaracterize

their

1983 conduct as "settlement negotiations."
admit they believed

that

post-February,

Since even they

their claims were against Froerer

rather than the Combes, there was nothing to "settle" with the
Combes.

See, Breuer-Harrison brief at p. 6.
Instead,

the

Developers

affirmed

the

real

estate

contract by, among other things, executing two amendments in
1984.

Thus, the real reason the Developers decided to back out

of the contract later in 1984 was not the pipeline, which had
been taken into account all along, but rapidly falling real
estate prices.

What had seemed like a good business deal for

the Developers in 1979 and 1980 had become a bad deal for them
by late 1984, for reasons having nothing to do with the pipeline or easement.

-3-

Rescission is an equitable remedy that required resolution of all of the above factual issues, and the District
Court erred in awarding this remedy by summary judgment.
C.

FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY FROERER AND ATGF.

The main factual issue raised by Froerer is the identity of his clients.

Although Froerer gave self-serving testi-

mony that he believed his client was Keil, one of the Developers' partners, Froerer's belief is not the issue.
gave the Combes
interests.

Froerer

reason to believe he was protecting their

Not only did Froerer prepare the contract between

the Combes and the Developers (as well as the earlier drafts
and the later amendments), he prepared the property transfer
documents between Keith and Clair Combe and their siblings, to
which the Developers were not parties.

See, Froerer Deposi-

tion, R. 1418, pp. 6-8, 19-20, 48, 55-56; Deposition of Combe,
R. 1411, pp. 25-29.

The legal work for both transactions was

paid for solely by the Combes.
Any confusion in Keith Combe's mind about Froerer's
role in the transaction was created by Froerer himself, who
breached his duties to Combe to fully disclose what that role
was, and to advise Combe if, despite all appearances to the
contrary, he was not protecting

Combe's

interests.

It was

Froerer that Combe paid to draft all of the above contracts,
not Paul Kunz.

-4-

The other factual issue raised by both Froerer and
ATGF is whether the Combes relied upon him or his admittedly
negligent title work done as ATGF' s agent.

As pointed out in

the Combes opening brief, Froerer and ATGF assert that their
negligence in failing to do the title work on time is a defense
to their negligence in failing to do the work properly.

How-

ever, the Combes relied upon Froerer as their attorney, and
upon ATGF as the party with whom they contracted for the work,
to advise them prior to closing if the title work had not been
done.
Froerer and ATGF were paid for that work at closing,
and the real estate contract Froerer drafted on the Combes*
behalf also required the title policy at closing (See, paragraph 8 of the contract, a copy of which is attached as Addendum B to the Combes' opening brief).

Were the Combes to assume

that Froerer had not performed the york, even though he had
already paid himself, and the documents he drafted required the
work to be performed before closing?

Froerer's silence could

only be interpreted to mean he had done the title work he
agreed to do, that there were no title defects, and that he had
furnished the title policy to the Developers.
Although Froerer paid himself out of his own escrow
account in January, 1980, the title policy was not issued by
Froerer until November, 1980.

-5-

Froerer knew at the time he

received payment that he had not completed the title work he
had agreed to do, both individually and as ATGF's authorized
agent.

However, he failed to advise the Combes of this.
Because the title policy was to be furnished at or

prior to closing, its purpose was the same as a preliminary
title report or abstract of title.

If the title work had been

done properly and on time, none of the resulting damages to the
Combes would have occurred.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I.
THE DEVELOPERS COULD NOT WAIT INDEFINITELY
BEFORE ASSERTING THEIR RESCISSION CLAIMS.
The central theme of the Developers' legal arguments
is that even if they were aware of the pipeline and easement
prior to acquiring the property, they could never waive or be
estopped from asserting rescission claims, no matter how long
they waited.

This argument is outlandish.

Their supporting

analysis of the case law on "anticipatory breach," and of the
distinction

between

"executory"

and

"executed"

contracts

is

faulty and contrary to the general legal principles governing
rescission of all types of contracts.
The best example of this is the Developers' reliance
on Hurvitz v. David K. Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P. 2d
794 (Utah, 1964).

While the Developers are correct that under

the Hurvitz line of cases a party generally can bring a damage
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claim either (1) at the time of the anticipatory breach or (2)
at the time performance is due, this does not apply if the
party chooses the third option available, rescission.

Under

Hurvitz, a party cannot continue "to recognize the contract so
long as it is profitable" to do so, and then rescind when the
contract becomes no longer profitable, 436 P.2d at 796.

More-

over, even the damage claim for an anticipatory breach may be
waived, where as here, the party's delay in bringing the claim
constitutes a failure to mitigate the alleged damages.

See,

University Club v. Invesco-Holdinq Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504
P. 2d 29 (1972) as quoted on p. 18 of the Breuer-Harrison brief.
One reason why, in some

instances, courts

allow a

party to wait before bringing a damage claim for anticipatory
breach, is because the breaching party may be able to cure the
breach before the time for performance is due.

Similarly, the

rationale behind the other line of cases relied upon by the
Developers, holding

that

there

is no waiver from delay in

asserting certain types of title defects, is that these defects
generally are curable.
Here, the district court correctly determined that the
existence of the pipeline could not be "cured."

However, the

court erred in relying on the anticipatory breach and nonwaiver
of title defect cases as justifying the Developers' waiver of
rescission.

The pipeline (even with the accompanying easement)

-7-

was not so much a title problem, as it was, according to the
Developers' allegations, a physical problem with the property.
Because the pipeline was unalterable, as the Developers knew,
there was simply no basis, either as a matter of legal reasoning, or plain common sense, to allow them to sit on their
rights (to the Combes' detriment).
For
attempt

to

similar reasons, the distinction the Developers
draw

between

waivers

of

rescission

claims

in

"executory" and "executed" contracts makes no sense as applied
to the facts of this case.

Obviously, an "anticipatory" breach

can only occur in an executory contract.

Here, however, the

Combes could no more remove the government pipeline at the time
the Developers claim they discovered it, than they could at
some time in the future when delivery of deeds was due.
"executory"

contract

became no different

The

than one on whch

performance had become due, the minute the Developers discovered the pipeline.

At that point, they had to make an elec-

tion, which they did by affirming the contract.
The

Developers'

agents were

aware of the pipeline

before the Developers agreed to purchase the property, and were
aware that the pipeline would always be there (as opposed to
the

mortgages

and

other

types

of

"curable"

title

defects

typically found

in the non-waiver cases cited by the Devel-

opers).

it

Thus,

must

be

presumed
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that

the

Developers

agreed to the pipeline as well.

Similarly, in executing two

amendments expressly affirming the contract after they admit
they had personal knowledge of the pipeline, the Developers
also affirmed their agreement to the pipeline.

See, Addendum C

to the Combes' opening brief.
Any other analysis would turn the law of rescission on
its ear.

The equitable principles upon which rescission is

based bar unreasonably delayed rescission claims on "executory"
as well as executed contracts.

These principles must also be

applied to bar the Developers' rescission claims here.
II.
FROERER'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST DID NOT RELIEVE
HIM OF HIS DUTIES TO THE COMBES AS HIS CLIENTS.
Froerer's argument that the conflict of interest he
created eliminated his duties to one of his conflicting groups
of clients, the Combes, is simply incredible.
victimized because Froerer
were as a lawyer.

The Combes were

ignored what his responsibilities

Apparently he still does not understand

these responsibilities.

Froerer's conflict of interest

is a

part of the malpractice claim created by his shoddy representation of the Combes' interests, not a defense to that claim.
Froerer

also

contends

that

this conflict

gave the

Combes the duty to determine whether he was adequately representing their

interests.

However, because of the sensitive

-9-

nature of the

fiduciary

duties

owed by

a lawyer, the

imposes a high standard of care upon the lawyer.
Lund,

13 Utah

lawyer's

2d

168, 369 P.2d

responsibility, not

933

(1962).-

law

Smoot v.
It

is

the

the client's, to clear up any

potential for misunderstanding over the scope of the lawyer's
legal

representation.

1195, 1203-1204

See, Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P. 2d

(Utah 1985).

Margulies

does not, as Froerer

contends, create a

different standard for the establishment of the attorney-client
relationship

in

conflict

malpractice cases.

of

interest

as

opposed

to

legal

In Margulies the Utah Supreme Court found

that the disqualified

law firm had established

at least an

implied attorney-client relationship with the limited partners
of a limited partnership who had reason to believe the law firm
was

representing

their

individual

interests.

However,

the

court did not address any malpractice implications raised by
the conflict.

696 P.2d at 1200.

Contrary to Froerer's argument, the Code of Professional Responsibility (now known as the Rules of Professional

- / While Smoot v. Lund sets forth the correct legal
standard, the Developers' reliance on this case is misplaced
because factually it is not on point. In Smoot, the client was
not misled by the attorney. Here, the Combes were misled by
Froerer both as to the status of Froerer's title work and
Froerer's role in the sale transaction.
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Conduct) certainly

is one source for determining the standard

of care owed by Froerer to the Combes.
that

standard

by

representing

Froerer's violation of

other clients with conflicting

interests in the same transaction, along with his other errors
and

omissions,

established

a

prima

facie

case

of

legal

malpractice.
III.
THE COMBES WERE INJURED BY BREACH OF FROERER'S
AND ATGF'S DUTY TO DO THE TITLE WORK IN AN
ACCURATE AND TIMELY FASHION.
ATGF
either

in

argues

contract

that
on

abstractor of title.-''

it owed

no duties

the title policy,

to the Combes,

or

in tort

as

an

Both ATGF and Froerer also argue that

the Combes were not damaged by any breach of duty, because the
Combes were

charged

with

knowledge

of

the

easement

as

the

owners of the property, and received the same property back in
the recission as they conveyed.

All of these

arguments

are

faulty.
Addressing ATGF's duties on the title policy

first,

ATGF cannot explain away the ambiguities in the title policy.
These ambiguities created disputed issues of material fact over
the proper interpretation of the policy.

Whether it was

—'
While ATGF complains of certain pleading ambiguities, the district court construed the pleadings broadly
enough to address all of the issues raised in the Combes'
opposition to ATGF's motion for summary judgment. These are
the same issued raised on this appeal.
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reasonable for the Combes to believe that their interests, as
well

as the Developers'

interests, were protected

by

this

policy could not be resolved summarily.
The policy must be interpreted from the standpoint of
a layman, not a lawyer.

Accordingly, while lawyers may be

expected to understand the fine distinctions between "legal"
and "equitable" interests in real property, laymen do not.-1'
More important, there is no evidence in the record that the
Combes

understood

this

distinction.

To

the

contrary,

Combes were very unsophisticated in real estate matters.
is why Froerer was retained.

the
This

Unfortunately for the Combes,

Froerer was wearing at least three hats—lawyer for the Combes,
lawyer for the Developers, and title agent of ATGF.
Similarly, how were the Combes supposed to know that
an "owners" policy did not protect their interest as "owners"
of the legal interest in the property?

How would the Combes

have known that what they really needed was a "lenders" policy,
when they weren't loaning money to anyone?
didn't tell them.

Froerer certainly

All the title policy (again, prepared by

Froerer but in what capacity?) had to do in order to avoid any

±y

Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P. 2d 802 (Utah
1987), relied upon by ATGF, dealt with the legal effect
judgment lien on a seller's interest in real property, not
the question of the ambiguous use in a contract of the
"equitable estate."
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App.
of a
with
term

ambiguity was simply identify the insureds by name.

This was

not done here, and ATGF and Froerer must bear the risk of the
resulting ambiguities.
ATGF contends that these ambiguities were resolved by
the real estate contract

since it required the policy to be

delivered to the Developers.

However, the Combes were justi-

fied in believing that the policy was being procured for their
benefit

as well,

provision

since

their

lawyer,

Froerer,

drafted

this

in the contract, agreed to do the title work, and

prepared the policy.
While ATGF now disclaims any liability for Froerer's
legal malpractice, it was in ATGF's interests to have a lawyer
as a title agent.
title

insurance

requirement

A lawyer is in a unique position to solicit
by,

as

here,

inserting

a

title

insurance

in a real estate contract for a client, and then

offering to write that insurance, to the benefit of his other
"client", the title insurer.

Certainly, ATGF cannot expect to

reap the benefits of this dual agency, without shouldering the
burdens as well.
ATGF also argues that it would be against

"customary

real estate practices" for the seller, rather than the buyer,
to be protected by title insurance.

However, ATGF cites to no

evidence in the record that such a "custom" exists, or that the
Combes were aware of any such custom.

Instead, ATGF improperly

asks this Court to take "judicial notice."
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The question

of what

is customary

in

real

estate

transactions really is part of the next issue, ATGF's liability
in tort.

If this Court is to take notice of anything, it ought

to take notice that in most real estate transactions, especially those involving inexperienced sellers such as the Combes,
the seller relies on title insurance to advise him or her of
the status of title, regardless of who the technical "insured"
may be.

As here, the seller needs to know whether there will

be any problems in performing on warranties of title.
to

ATGF's

argument

at

page

12 of

its brief, the

Contrary
"better

reasoned cases", which are also in the majority, hold that a
negligent title insurer has liability in tort as well as on the
policy.

See, White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 710 P.2d

309 (Cal. 1985 en banc); Shada v. Title Trust Co. of Florida,
457 So.2d 553 (Fla. App. 1984); Malinak v. Safeco Title Insurance Co. of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12 (Mont. 1983); Heyd v. Chicago
Title Insurance Co., 354 N.W. 2d 154 (Neb. 1984); Moore v.
Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. 1985);
Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 84 0
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1988).
Neither this Court nor the Utah
squarely addressed the issue.

Supreme Court has

However, dicta in Bush v. Coult,

594 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) (stating that title insurance
warrants title), suggests that the Supreme Court would follow
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the majority rule.

This is the rule that is consistent with

the realities of most real estate transactions.
The distinction ATGF attempts to draw between negligence liability on a title insurance report or commitment as
opposed to a title policy is unpersuasive.

Where, as here, a

title policy is issued without a preliminary commitment, there
is no basis for such a distinction.

If anything, the reasons

for imposing negligence liability on the policy are stronger.
In this instance, the policy was both an abstract of title,
creating duties in tort, as well as a contract of insurance.
Moreover, if, as ATGF contends, the Combes were not covered by
the policy, then the waiver of negligence provision
policy relied on by ATGF does not apply to them.

in the

Of course

this assumes that a title policy is the type of adhesion contract in which Utah public policy would permit such a waiver,
which is doubtful.

See, DRC, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P. 2d

433, 438 (Utah 1983); Bush v. Coult, supra.
Assuming the title policy created ATGF duties in tort
as well as contract, the question then becomes to whom those
tort duties were owed.

Under Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§ 552 (1977), and general tort law, ATGF owed duties to all
those who could reasonably be expected to rely upon the title
policy, or timely performance of the title work.

This includes

the Combes, as the sellers in this "customary" real estate
transaction.
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The questions of whether and to whom a duty in tort is
owed are usually characterized as legal issues.

However, even

the case law relied upon by ATGF suggests that these issues
cannot be resolved without a careful examination of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the particular transaction
at issue.

See, Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. Johnson,

693 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1985).

Here, the factual complexity added

by the many roles Froerer played certainly made these issues
not susceptible to summary judgment.
The arguments of Froerer and ATGF that the Conobes suffered no damage are even less persuasive.

Landowners cannot,

as a matter of law, be charged with knowledge of unknown title
defects, especially defects not of their own making.

Other-

wise, the Developers would be charged with the same knowledge
as the Combes.

The very real possibility of title problems

unknown to the owner
exists.

is the whole

reason

title

insurance

If, as a matter of law, landowners were to be charged

with knowledge of unknown title defects, this would be all the
more reason for them to rely on the title insurer.-'

-'
Despite the insinuations of ATGF, Froerer and
the Developers, there is no evidence that Keith Combe and his
wife were aware of the pipeline at the time of sale. The pipeline condemnation occurred years before Keith and his wife took
title, at a time when Keith had no involvement with the property. Tr. 213-216. The condemnation award was paid to his
parents.
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The contention that the recission resulted in no loss
or damage to the Combes makes no more sense.

The net result is

that the Combes will be required to sell the property in order
to pay the $370,000 Judgment.

However, because the property is

now worth only about $280,000 (as opposed to the $410,880 sales
price

in

$90,000.

1979),

they

will

Tr. 193-194.

still

In Citicorp

owe

the

Savings

Developers
of

over

Illinois v.

Stewart Title Guar. Co., supra, the court held the negligent
title insurer liable for loss in value of the insured property
caused by market factors not directly related to the undisclosed title defect.

Damages resulting from a buyer's claim of

recission based on allegedly undisclosed and uncurable title
defects in property, preceded by loss in market value of the
property, are certainly forseeable enough to present to a jury
either on a proximate cause theory in tort, or a consequential
damage theory in contract.
If the title work had been done correctly and on time,
one of two things would have happened.

The first possibility

is that the Developers would not have gone through with the
sale, and the Combes would have had the opportunity to sell the
property to other developers while market values were still
high.

See, n. 6, infra.

The more likely possibility (in light

of the engineers' admitted contemporaneous knowledge of the
pipeline) is that the sale would have gone forward, with any
claim for recission precluded, and the Combes' opportunity to
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enforce their contractual rights intact.

ATGF and Froerer are

liable for their errors and omissions that precluded the Combes
from exercising either opportunity.
IV.
FROERER'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT
IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND IS
SUBSTANTIVELY WITHOUT MERIT.
Froerer did not raise the four-year statute of limitations in his summary judgment motion, nor did the district
court rule on the issue in granting that motion.

A summary

judgment may not be affirmed on grounds other than those relied
upon by the lower court, unless those grounds are at least
argued below.

See, Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills

Development Co. , 614 P. 2d 155 (Utah 1980).

Accordingly, the

question of when the statute began to run may not be raised on
this appeal.

Nonetheless, the lack of substantive merit to

Froerer1s argument also will be addressed briefly.
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court appear
to have directly decided when a legal malpractice right of
action arises under Utah law for purposes of the statute of
limitations.

The courts in other jurisdictions are divided.

However, a number of courts hold that the statute does not
begin to run until the client

is damaged.

See, Ft. Myers

Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); cert, den. , 390 U.S. 946 (1968) Melgard v. Hanna,
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607 P.2d 795 (Ore. App. 1980); Cox v. Rosser, 579 S.W.2d 73
(Tex. App. 1979).
tions, the

Under the law of a number of other jurisdic-

statute does not begin to run until the client

discovers the malpractice.

See, Neei v. Magana, Olney, Levy,

Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P. 2d 421 (Cal. 1971); Petes v. Simmons,
552 P.2d 1053 (Wash. 1976).
Under

either

of these theories, the Combes' cross-

claim for legal malpractice filed in August, 1986 was timely.
The Combes had no reason to know of Froerer' s negligence until
receipt of the accurate title policy in February, 1983.
they

were

specifically

told

the

Froerer to solve the problem.

Developers

would

Then

look

to

The Combes had no potential

claims for damages until October, 1984 when the Developers'
recission claim was filed.
In Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105, 51 P. 261 (1897),
the client's cause of action against his attorney for conversion of certain promissory notes given to the attorney for
collection did not accrue until demand for return of the notes
was made and refused.

Assuming Stevens is still good law, it

indicates the Utah Supreme Court is likely to follow the rule
that the statute does not begin to run until damage occurs,
i.e., the refusal or failure to return the notes in Stevens.
This rule is also the one that makes the most sense as
applied to the facts of the case at hand.
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The Combes had no

reason to

even consider

a claim

against Froerer until the

Developers asserted their recission claims.

Until then, it was

the Developers who were indicating through their agents that
they intended to pursue claims against Froerer.
Developers

were performing

Combes were not injured.

and

affirming

So long as the

the contract, the

Any premature claim that the Combes

filed against Froerer would have been dismissed for that very
reason.
In sum, an important and far reaching issue of first
impression under Utah law should not be decided until it is
properly

before

reasonable

or

the
fair

appellate
theory,

the

court.
Combes'

However,

under

malpractice

any
claim

against Froerer was timely.
V.
BIFURCATION ON THE EVE OF TRIAL WAS UNTIMELY
AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE COMBES.
All three respondents contend that the

last minute

bifurcation of the Developers' claims against Froerer and ATGF,
to which these parties stipulated but the Combes objected, was
proper.

However, these three parties cannot stipulate away the

prejudice to the Combes.
Respondents offer no justification for their delay in
submitting this stipulation, which was typical of their tactics
throughout the litigation

in the lower court.

Instead they

merely argue that the claims between themselves were of no

-20-

concern to the Combes.

ATGF admits that part of the justifica-

tion given to the district court for the belated stipulation
was that the bifurcated claims likely would be settled.

How-

ever, no such settlement was ever reached.
Respondents

ignore the prejudice to the Combes that

resulted not just from the bifurcation itself, but from the
accompanying exclusion of all evidence related to the errors
and omissions of Froerer, including those contained in the ATGF
title policy.

This prevented the Combes from defending the

damage claim at issue on the basis that Froerer and ATGF, not
the Combes, were the cause of any injury to the Developers.
The Developers' own agents had admitted this to Keith Combe
before the action was ever filed, telling him not to worry.
Equity requires that all of the surrounding circumstances be
considered
remedy.

in

fashioning

the proper

form of the recission

This remedy could include such things as apportionment

of restitution among all of the liable parties, according to
fault.
The prejudice to the Combes in being prevented from
presenting any of these theories was compounded by the fact
that the bifurcation stipulation was timed so late as to preclude the Combes from developing alternative theories.

This

prejudice clearly outweighs any prejudice that the respondents
speculate would have resulted from a trial that included all of
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the parties.

Although the abuse of discretion standard is a

narrow one, it has been met in this case.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN
CALCULATING FAIR RENTAL VALUE WITHOUT REGARD
TO FAIR MARKET VALUE AND IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST TO THE DEVELOPERS.
If, as argued above, the summary judgment of rescission was erroneous and must be reversed, then this Court need
not reach the issues of restitutionary damages or prejudgment
interest.

Nonetheless, the Combes will briefly

damage issue.
judgment

address

the

The Developers apparently concede that the pre-

interest award was improper, since they

failed to

address that issue in their brief.
While the Developers characterize the issue of the
amount of the fair rental value offset as a battle of the
experts, the district court's error was not in weighing the
evidence

or

evaluating

the

credibility

of

Instead, the lower court made a legal error

the witnesses.
in failing to

consider a basic element of the fair rental value equation that
the Utah Supreme Court has said needs to be considered—the
fair market value of the property at its highest and best use.
See, Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d

559 (Utah 1985) and the

other cases cited at p. 46 of the Combes' opening brief.
In failing

to consider

this

element, the

district

court also ignored the economic realities of the transaction.
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If the Combes had not sold the property to the Developers, they
would have had the opportunity to sell it to other developers
for a price equal to or above the price the Developers were
willing

to pay.-x

From an equivalent

sale, the Combes also

would have received the same or more annual

income than they

received from the sale to the Developers, but were required to
return by the court.
property

for

opportunity.

almost

The Developers' occupancy and use of the
five years

deprived

the Combes

of

this

The purpose of the rescission remedy is to return

the parties to their positions at the time of the transaction
being
1969).

rescinded.

See, Shepard v.

Dick,

453 P.2d

134

(Kan.

The amount of the rental offset awarded to the Combes

failed to do this.
The court also failed to take into account that the
reason the value of the property had declined so dramatically
was because of the inequitable conduct-' of the Developers in
failing to claim rescission before the bottom fell out of the

—'
The evidence at trial established that another
buyer, James Keizerman, was willing to pay a higher price for
the property. Like the Developers' planners, Keizerman didn't
perceive the pipeline to be a significant impediment to
development at the time. Tr. 334-343.
-I/
While the Developers
accuse
the Combes
of
inequitable conduct in seeking both the property and the money
due on the contract, this is unfounded.
All the Combes ever
sought was what they were entitled to under the contract.
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real estate market.
consider

these

Developers

Even if the court had not been required to

equities,

would

have

the

case

required

law

the

relied

court

delay as a failure to mitigate damages.

to

upon

by

consider

the

their

See, University Club

v. Invesco-Holdinq Corp., supra.
Because none of these factors was considered by the
district court, its damage judgment must be reversed, as well
as

the

award

of

prejudgment

interest

not

addressed

in the

Developers' brief.
CONCLUSION
At
district

every

court

critical

made

stage

crucial

in

legal

these

errors

proceedings,
that

deprived

the
the

Combes of their right to a trial of all of the factual issues
between all of the parties.
fully

renew

their

request

Accordingly, the Combes respectthat

the

summary

reversed and that such a trial be ordered.
damage

and prejudgment

interest

awards

judgments

be

Alternatively, the

must

be

stricken

or

remanded for new trial or recalculation.
DATED this 10th day of August, 1989.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Jfcm^s A. Boevers
Attorneys for Appellants Keith P.
and Evelyn Combe
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COURT OF APPEALS

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Breuer-Harrison, Inc., et al.
v. Keith P. Combe, et al.
Case No. 880353-CA
Argued;
March 29, 1990

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondent Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. calls
the court's attention to the recent Utah Supreme Court case of
Culp Construction Company v. Build-Mart Mall, 137 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4 (decided June 27, 1990). A copy of the case is attached hereto.
This case pertains to Point II as set forth in the Brief
of Respondent Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and specificially to the authorities beginning at page 12. Respondent
in its brief pointed out that there existed a split of authorities on the issue of abstracter's tort liability. Culp
adopts the position urged by respondent and holds that a title
insurance company incurs liability only under its contract of
insurance when it issues a policy of title insurance and does
not incur liability for abstracter's negligence for any omissions in its statement of the status of the title to the
property insured. The decision in Culp appears to eliminate
appellant Combes' claim based upon abstracter's negligence.
The issue of negligent mispresentation as discussed in
Culp is not material because it is undisputed in the instant
case that no preliminary title report was ever issued or
relied upon.
Hopefully the above will be of assistance to the court in

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals
July llf 1990
Page -2-

resolving the issues of this case.
Very truly yours,

David E. West
Attorney for Attorneys1
Title Guaranty Fundf Inc.
DEW:bh
c.c.

John P. Ashton
Erik Strindberg
Jack L. Schoenhals
Theodore E. Kannell
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White v. Slaile of Utah
J37 Utah A tIvJtcjLj
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chon over a case while it is under advisement
CUc it
on appeal J Wc have made exceptions to the
137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
rule in the interest of preventing unnecessary
IN T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
delay, where any action by the trial court is I
not likely to modify a party's rights with
OF T H E STATE O F UTAH
respect to the issues raised on appeal Thus in
Peters v Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P 2d 71 CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
(1964), we held that the district court, which Federal Insurance Company,
has continuing jurisdiction after entry of a I
Plaintiffs,
final divorce decree, may adjudicate a petition
v.
to modify the decree due to a change of arc
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited
umstances while the decree is pending on partnership, et al ,
appeal since the petition for modification is I
Defendants,
collateral to the divorce decree Similarly, I
and
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and
final a judgment against one party in a multi I Appellant,
party action, the remainder of the action
v.
remains in the trial court and is not necessarily Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation,
affected by the appeal In that case, the trial |
Defendant, Third-Party Defendant, and
court has jurisdiction* to proceed with the
Appellee.
claims remaining unadjudicated
Lane v
Mcsscr, 689 P 2d 1333 (Utah 1984)
No. 880388
In the instant case, defendants seek to FILED: June 27, 1990
reduce the judgment against them by amounts
which they aver have already been paid to Third District, Salt Lake County
plaintiff « An adjudication of the motion, Honorable Raymond S Uno
though a modification of the judgment may
result, will not affect the legal issues raised ATTORNEYS:
John P . Ashton, Brian S King, Salt Lake
here with respect to attorney fees and defen
City, and John A. Kincaid, Jr , John R.
dams' liability Under these circumstances, wc
O'Keefc, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while
the distnet court has the matter under consiappellant
deration, as that will only delay proceedings
Jeffrey R Ontt, Robert S Howell, Salt Lake
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule
City, and Mark T. Davenport, Doug T.
60(b) motion and may deny it without interf
Butler, Dallas, Texas, for appellee
erence from this court If the motion is
granted, the trial court in this case need only
This opinion is subject to revision before
advise this court that the judgment has been
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
modified The district court action granting or
denying the motion and the modified judg
HALL, Chief Justice:
ment should be included in the record when it
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Associais prepared for review by this court
tion appeals from a grant of summary judgDefendants' motion to stay proceedings and ment in favor of Lawyers Title Insurance
remand the case to the district court is denied, Corporation The trial court found that no
and the district court is directed to hear and genuine issue of material fact existed with
determine the rule 60(b) motion
regard to Tower Federal Savings and Loan
Association's complaint that Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation owed Tower Federal
1 Indeed it hus been observed thai the rule prov
Savings and Loan a duty to disclose all record
»dcs a "nice balance between the interest In finality
|of judgments] and the desire to achieve Justice " title information
Wc affirm In part and
Wright A Miller 11 / cdcrul Practice and Procedure
reverse in part.
§2872(1973)
FACTS
2 Long v Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F 2d
i On appeal from summary judgment, wc
1310 13l8(9thCir 1981)
3 See eg Smith v Kunball, 76 Utah 350, 289 l» look at the facts in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.'
588(1930)
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a Utah
4 We of course, express no opinion on the merits
of the motion that being for the trial court to del limited partnership, was established to develop
I and construct, in Salt Lake County, a retail
ermine

I shopping mall and warehouse distribution
center specializing in custom building materI J«I, i?i,nsf.n« for the nroiect was essentially

CODE • co
Provo U u h

Culp Construction C . v. Buildmart Mall
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pment revenue bonds ("IRBs") in the face
amount of $7,750,000 First Security Bank of
Utah, N A ("first Security"), acted as indenture trustee on the IRB loan through its
corporate trust department The deed of trust
securing the IRB loan was recorded on September 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's office
During the summer of 1984, the principal of
the project determined that a funding shortfall
of approximately $500,000 existed for the
completion of the project Tower Federal
Savings and Loan Association ("Tower") was
approached by a mortgage broker, RichardsWoodbury Mortgage Corporation ("RichardsWoodbury"), with respect to lending Buildmart Mall $750,000, secured by a second
position deed of trust to the project, in order
to complete construction
Richards-Woodbury retained Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to
provide a commitment for title insurance and
issue a title insurance policy. Richmond Title
Company ("Richmond Title"), the local agent
for Lawyers Title, furnished RichardsWoodbury with a commitment for title insurance that revealed certain encumbrances and
hens against the title Richmond Title also
acted as local agent for Lawyers Title in
writing the subsequent title policy
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K Woodbury,
acting as agent for Tower, wrote a letter to
Richmond Title delineating escrow instructions
for the funds to be loaned by Tower Richmond Title was instructed, among other
things, to deposit the funds into an escrow
account and to release the funds to Buildmart
Mall only when Richmond Title had taken
steps to "insure that the Trust Deed enclosed
herewith
is in a second hen position behind
(First Security Bank)" and "[tjhe only prior
exceptions to the Trust Deed should be those
listed in your Commitment for Title Insurance." In addition, the escrow instructions
directed Richmond that if it was "unable or
unwilling to promptly follow all of the above
referenced instructions," it was to forego disbursement of the funds.
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but after
the commitment for title insurance ("the
commitment") had been issued, numerous
hens appeared of record that were not reported by Lawyers Title or Richmond Title on
the commitment Richmond nevertheless disbursed the funds, and the Tower loan was
secured by a second deed of trust that was
recorded on March 20, 1985, in the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the developer defaulted on its loan with Tower, as well
as its obligations under the IRB loan Culp
Construction Company ("Culp"), the developer's primary general contractor, filed a

lv.

RCD.

4

ered us defense of the litigation to Lawyers
Title under the terms of the title insurance
policy Lawyers Title accepted the tender of
defense subject to a reservation of rights
First Security initiated nonjudicial forcclo
sure proceedings against the project as trustee
under the indenture of trust and, on March
16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at which First
Security acquired the project As a result of
the foreclosure proceedings, all hens junior to
the first hen held by first Security, including
the Tower trust deed, were extinguished by
operation of law Tower and its counsel did
not take any action to stop the foreclosure sale
or protect its security interest.
A settlement was reached between all
parties, resulting in the dismissal of all claims
with prejudice, with the exception of the
claims between Tower and Lawyers Title All
outstanding mechanic's liens on the project
were released as part of the settlement
On appeal from summary judgment in favor
of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that there are
genuine issues of material fact with respect to
three causes of action breach of contract,
breach of an implied contractual obligation of
good faith and fair dealing, and negligent
misrepresentation
I. BRFACII OF CONTRACT
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title
breached a contractual duty to accurately
report the status of the title at the time the
Tower loan was closed The record reveals
that the only contractual privity Tower had
with Lawyers Title was the title insurance
policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title
through its local agent, Richmond Title
The essence o( Tower's claim is that as part
of the title insurance process, Lawyers Title
issued a commitment for title insuiance to
Richards-Woodbury that was not updated
and upon which Tower relied in making the
loan Tower claims that certain mechanic's
hens of record uere not included as an update
to the commitment and that additional hens
would have indicated a "red flag" that the
project was underfunded, which would have
caused Tower to decline advancing any loan
funds to Buildmart
Lawyers Title presents three arguments to
support summar> judgment on the breach ol
contract issue. Its first argument is that the
only contract it had with Tower was the title
insurance policy itself and that it fulfilled nil
requirements of the policy. Second, Lawyers
Title argues that the commitment for title
insurance that preceded the title policy was
issued to Richards Woodbury, not to Tower,
and therefore no privity existed between
Lawyers Title and Tower with regard to the
commitment Third, Lawyers Title argues that
a commitment or preliminary title report is not

Culp Construction CI!o. v. Buildmart Mall
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OUJuh
h is lirst to be observed that lawyers Ink
fully and adequately defended Tower's second
hen position as it was obligated to do by the
terms of the title insurance policy For that
reason, Tower s cause of action for breach of
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
or the duty to bargain in good faith is unsu
pportcd by the facts Hence, we affirm the
conclusion of the tml court that no genuine
issue of material fact exists with respect to
breach of the contractual duty of good faith
and lair dealing '
As to whether a title insurance company is
an abstractor of title, some jurisdictions hold
title insurance companies to the standard of
liability generally associated with abstractors J
However, we believe that the better-reasoned
approach is to consider preliminary title
reports and commitments for title insurance as
"no more than a statement of the terms and
conditions upon which the insurer is willing to
issue its title policy
"4 Indeed, "(tine prevailing view remains not to impose liability in
tort on a title company "5
Utah Code Ann §31A 1-301(82) (1986
& Supp 1989) defines title insurance as
the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying of owners of real or
personal property or the holders of
liens or encumbrances on that pro
pcrty, or others interested in the
property against loss or damage
suffered by reason of hens or encumbrances upon delects in, or the
unmarkctabihty of the title to the
property, or invalidity or unenforceability of any hens or encumbra
nceson the property
It is also to be observed that a duty is
imposed by statute upon title insurers to make
a reasonable search and examination of title
for the purpose of determining insurability
Utah Code Ann §31A-20-110(1) (1986)
states in part "No title insurance policy may
be written until the title insurer or its agent
has conducted a reasonable search and exam
ination of the title and has made a determm
ation of insurability of title under sound
underwriting principles " Nevertheless, even
though section 31A 20 110(1) imposes a
duty of a reasonable search and examination
for the purpose of determining the insurability
of title, it does not impose a duty to abstract
titles upon title insurance companies
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah
Code, however, "abstract of title" has been
defined as
(a) condensed history of the title to
land, consisting qf a synopsis or
summary of the material or operative portion of all the conveyances.

cooc^co

any estate or Interest therein, together with a statement of all liens,
charges, or liabilities to which the
same may be subject, and of which
is In any way material for purchasers to be apprised An epitome of
the record evidence of title, including maps, plats, and other aids °
The function, form, and character of a title
insurer is different from that of an abstractor
One who hires a title insurance company docs
so for the purpose of obtaining the assurance
or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in
the chain of title rather than for the purpose
of discovering the title status. A title insurance
company's function is generally confined to
the practice of insurance, not to the practice
of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of its
| status as a title insurance company.
II. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The next claim asserted by Tower is that
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond
Title, negligently misrepresented the state of
the title in the commitment for title insurance
The trial court held that because "negligent
misrepresentation" is a tort claim, it could not
be asserted separately from the breach of
contract claim when the alleged misrepresent
ation arose out of the contractual relationship
of the parties according to our decision in Beck
v Farmers Insurance Exchange.1
In Beck, an insured brought an action
against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to
settle a claim for insured motorist benefits
The insured alleged breach of contract, breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress With regard to the emotional distress
tort claim, we held that "in a first party
relationship between an insurer and us
insured, the duties and obligations of the
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary
Without more, a breach of those implied or
express duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort "• However,
our holding in Beck does not preclude the
bringing of a tort claim independently of a
contract claim. In Beck, we specifically stated
"We recognize that in some cases the acts
constituting a breach of contract may also
result in breaches of duty that are independent
of the contract and may give rise to causes of
action in tort."* Statutory requirements that
give rise to independent causes of action under
various unfair practices acts may also give rise
I to independent tort actions >•
Negligent misrepresentation occurs "Iwjhere
one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, is in a superior position to know material
J facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a
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suffers loss in that transaction
"" 1 unlit
Durham, Justice, having disqualified
rmore, "privity of contract is not a necessary herself, docs not participate herein, Hillings,
prerequisite to liability ""
Court of Appeals Judge, sat
In the instant case, Tower asserts a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation because
Lawyers Title provided a commitment for title 1 Owens v Garfield 784 P 2d 1187, 1188 (Utah
insurance to Richards-Woodbury, a mort- 1989)
tfee* v larmcrs Ins Hxc/i 701 P 2d 795
gage broker, with the knowledge that Tower 2798Sec
(Utah 1985)
would rely upon the commitment in making J Sec c g , Moore \ Title Ins Co of Minnesot»
the loan Genuine issues of material fact exist 148 Ariz 408 714 l> 2d 1303 1306 07 (C\ App
with regard to whether Lawyers Title knew 1985) (title company win be held liable in ion lot u>
that Tower would rely upon the commitment negligence when it holds itself out as a searcher of
in making the loan Indications of reliance on titles and provides the information for the applic
the commitment may arise from the fact that ants to act upon), McLaughlin v Attorneys' Tide
the title insurance policy was issued to both Guaranty Fund, Inc, 61 111 App 3d 911, 378
Richards-Woodbury and Tower In addition, NE2d 355, 359 (1978) (when a person seeks title
the escrow instructions given to Lawyers insurance, he expects to obtain a professional title
Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal that the search legal opinion as to the condition of title and
a guarantee). Ford v Guarantee Abstract & Title
loan was contingent upon the status of the Co, 220 Kan 224, 553 P 2d 254, 264 66 (1976)
title remaining the same at the time of closing (where title insurance company held out to the
as it was when the commitment was provided.
public and assumed to discharge the same duties as
Lawyers Title argues that because a comm- an individual conveyancer or attorney), Dorr v
itment is not an abstract of title, Tower could Mass Title Ins Co, 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191
not reasonably rely upon it as a comprehensive (1921) (title Insurance company held to have acted
not merely as a tale insurer but also as a paid agent
statement of the status of the title. We have tn
examining the title), Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins
heretofore concluded that the commitment for Co, 218 Neb 296, 354 N W.2d 154, 158-59 (1984)
title insurance or a preliminary title report in (when rendering a title report and issuing a policy a
this case was not an abstract of title; however, title insurance company assumes the two distinct
it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent, duties of abstractor and title insurer), Sunset
Richmond Title, may have assumed the duties Holding Corp v Home Title Ins Co , 172 Misc
and responsibilities of an abstractor when it 759, 16 N Y S 2d 273 (1939) (purchaser of realty
received the escrow instructions from Tower's was entitled to recover against title insurance
agent which explicitly directed Richmond not company for negligent examination of title where
to transfer the loan funds unless the title title report was iniccuratc on dimensions of prop
status remained the same as stated on the crty)
4 See, e g , Lawrence v Chicago Title Ins Co , 237
commitment
Cal Rptr 264 267 (Cnl App 1987) (the Cahfornn
We hold that summary judgment on the Supreme Court upheld White v Western Title Ins
issue of negligent misrepresentation was ina- Co 221 Cal Rpir 509 710 P 2d 470 (1986), which
ppropriate because our decision in Beck docs applied abstractor liability to title insurance comp
not preclude a separate independent tort In anies, but court noted that cause of action arose in
addition, material factual issues remain as to the Lawrence case after California legislature had
whether Lawyers Title owed a contractual duty passed a law eliminating abstractor liability for title
to Tower to represent the true status of the insurance companies) see also Brown's Tie <£
title upon receipt and acceptance of the escrow Lumber v Chicago Title Co of Idaho, 115 Idaho
56, 764 P 2d 423, 426 27 (1988) (upholding And
instructions and at all times thereafter when erson and stating that to fall outside of the Andc
Lawyers Title knew, or in the exercise of rea- rson rule it must be show that abstractor duties were
sonable diligence should have known, of voluntarily assumed), Anderson v Title Ins Co ,
additional mechanic's liens against the subject 103 Idaho 875, 655 P 2d 82, 86 (1982) (refused to
property. Should it be determined that impose the liabilities of an abstractor upon a title
Lawyers Title owed Tower a duty of disclo- insurance company merely because it issued a prel
sure, other questions of material fact also iminary title report), Horn v Lawyers Title Ins Co ,
exist, including whether that duty was brea- 89 N M 709, 557 P 2d 206, 208 (1976) (no duty of
ched and whether Tower reasonably relied Ude insurance company to search records unless
upon the commitment, thereby defeating a express or implied m the policy)
5 Walker Rogge, Inc v Chelsea Title & Guaranty
motion for summary judgment.
Co. 116N J 517, 562 A 2d 208,219 (1989)
Remanded for further proceedings consis- 6 Black's Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed 1979) relat
tent with this opinion
lonship of the parties according to our decision in
7 701 P 2d 795 (Utah 1985)
8 Id at 800
WE CONCUR.
9 Id at 800, n 3 (citing Sams v Eccles, 11 Utah 2d
I Daniel Stewart, Justice
289, 358 P2d 344 (1961) (intentionally causing
Michael D Zimmerman, Justice
severe emotional distress to others), Wetherbee v
Judith M. Billings, Court of Appeals Judge
United Ins Co, 265 Cal App 2d 921, 71 Cal
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judgment
dismissing
its
complaint
against
10 See, eg
Utah Code Ann
§§13 5 2 5
defendant State of Utah Defendant and
(Supp
1989) 76 9 50! to 509 (1978), 76 10
706 to 708 (1978) 76 10 710(1978)
counterclaimant Staker Paving and Constru11 Jardwe v Brunswick Corp, 18 Utah 2d 378,
ction appeals the grant of summary judgment
381, 423 P 2d 659, 662 (1967) see also Pnce-Orem entered in favor of the State dismissing
Investment Co v Rollins, Brown <ft Gunnel!, 713 Staker's counterclaim against the State

8

P 2d 55 59 (Utah 1986) Restatement (Second) of
Torts §552 (1965)
12 Price Orem 713 P 2d at 59, Chnstcnson v
Commonwealth land Title Ins (To 666 P 2d 302
W7 (Utah 1983)
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I. FACTS
Christensen & Griffith contracted with
Provo City to construct the East Bay Golf
Course Construction of the golf course began
in mid-March of 1984 At approximately the
same time, the State began building two dikes
running parallel to and along both sides of
Interstate 15 ("1-15"), the major freeway
running north and south through Provo. To
the east of 1-15 lies a range of mountains
Runoff water drains from the mountains and
flows westward toward Utah Lake, which lies
to the west of 1-15
The East Bay Golf Course is located immediately east of 1-15, between the mountains
and the freeway. At this location, the roadbed
on which 1-15 lies acts as a dam or dike,
stopping the flow of water from the mountains toward the lake. Because of this condition, several culverts were constructed underneath 1-15 to allow water to flow unimpeded
to Utah Lake.
As part of the State's diking project in
1984, the culverts under 1-15 had to be extended to run under the new dikes. To facilitate the culvert extension, the State's contractor, Staker Paving, built coffer dams. These
coffer dams were mounds of earth built
around the culverts and the areas into which
the culverts would be extended The water
trapped behind the coffer dams was pumped
out to create a dry area in which the extensions on the ends of the culverts could be built
However, with the coffer dams in place, the
water could not flow through the culverts
toward Utah Lake.
Christensen & Griffith alleges that the State
and Staker negligently allowed the coffer dams
to remain in place after Staker's project was
completed, thus damming the water and
causing the water level on the east side of I15 to rise Christensen & Griffith alleges
further that this caused flooding in the area of
construction of the golf course. Christensen &
Onffith complains that this made their work
much more difficult. The work was slowed
because of the necessity to work in water, the
need to use draglines Instead of backhoes, and
the need to move material twice.
Plaintiffs Provo City and Christensen &
Griffith originally filed this action on May 13,
1985 The Stale filed un answer and crossclaim against its contractor Staker. Staker
filed an answer to the original complaint and
to the State's cross-claim and also filed a
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Staker based on an argument that the State
was immune from suit for flood-related
activities under a 1984 amendment to Utah
Code Ann §63-30-3. The State's motion
was granted as to both of plaintiffs* claims
and as to Staker's counterclaim Provo City
and Christensen & Griffith independently
appealed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the State The appeal of Provo City
was dismissed after it settled out of court with
the State Staker also appealed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the State
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law Utah R. Civ
P. 56(c); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 773 P 2d 1382,
1385 (Utah 1989) When we review a trial
court's grant of summary judgment, we
analyze the facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the losing party. Copper
State Leasing Co v. Blacker Appliance &
Furniture Co., 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988)
We review the trial court's conclusions of law
for correctness Madsen v Borthick, 769 P 2d
245, 247 (Utah 1988)
III ANALYSIS
A. Statute
Utah Code Ann §63-30-3 (1989) provides as follows:
Exccpt as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility,
and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional
health care clinical training program
conducted in cither public or private
facilities
The management of flood waters
and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered
to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their
officers are immune from suit for
any injury or damage resulting from
those activities
(Emphasis added ) The State argues that (he
immunity granted for flood control management is absolute and not subject to the waivers
of immunity provided in sections 63-30-5
through 63-30-10 5 of the Governmental

.

immunity ") Christensen & Griffith argues that
the second paragraph should be read to
provide only a qualified immunity for flood
control activities, which would make the
immunity subject to the waiver provisions
(This argument is hereinafter referred to as the
argument for "qualified immunity ") The
central issue in this case is the choice between
these two positions
B I egislative History
The amendment adding the second paragraph to §63-30-3 was enacted in 1984 as
part of Senate Bill No. 97, entitled "Flood
Rehef-1984 " 1984 Utah Laws ch 33, §1
This governmental immunity amendment was
only a small part of a larger act which provided for various actions by different state
agencies to respond to recent flooding and
expected flooding Senator Finhnson, the
Senate sponsor of the bill, discussed the
purpose of the amendment to §63-30-3 on
the Senate floor
And what we're really trying to do
is encourage the public sector to
take action to prevent damage Salt
Lake City is probably one of the,
and the Salt Lake County program
with the tremendous effort they did
t h r o u g h their flood c o n t r o l
program It did cost money but
they saved, you know, millions of
dollars worth of damage to the
private sector and we want them to
be able to make good decisions
relative to flood control without
worrying about somebody coming
back and suing [them] less (sic] and
second guessing [themj in that very
situation
1984 Senate Bill No 97, Day 20 (Saturday,
January 28, 1984, afternoon session)
(emphasis added) This statement indicates
that in enacting this amendment, the legislature intended to encourage governmental entities to take action to prevent damage from
expected flooding
Senator Finltnson's statement is consistent
with either an absolute or a qualified immunity interpretation of §63-30-3. The statement is consistent with the qualified immunity interpretation because Senator rinlinsou
stated that the legislature wanted public sector
decision-makers to be able to make decisions
relating to flood control without worrying
about someone "second guessing" them. This
purpose is met by classifying flood control
activities as "governmental functions " If
flood control is classified as a "governmental
function," a governmental entity would be
liable for ordinary negligence committed in
flood control activities, but would not ncccs-
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COURT OF APPEALS

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Breuer-Harrison, Inc., et al.
v. Keith P. Combe, et al.
Case No. 880353-CA
Argued;
March 29, 1990

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondent Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. calls
the court's attention to the recent Utah Supreme Court case of
Culp Construction Company v. Build-Mart Mall, 137 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4 (decided June 27, 1990). A copy of the case is attached hereto.
This case pertains to Point II as set forth in the Brief
of Respondent Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and specificially to the authorities beginning at page 12. Respondent
in its brief pointed out that there existed a split of authorities on the issue of abstracter's tort liability. Culp
adopts the position urged by respondent and holds that a title
insurance company incurs liability only under its contract of
insurance when it issues a policy of title insurance and does
not incur liability for abstracter's negligence for any omissions in its statement of the status of the title to the
property insured. The decision in Culp appears to eliminate
appellant Combes' claim based upon abstracter's negligence.
The issue of negligent mispresentation as discussed in
Culp is not material because it is undisputed in the instant
case that no preliminary title report was ever issued or
relied upon.
Hopefully the above will be of assistance to the court in

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Utah Court: of Appeals
July 11 r 1990
Page -2-

resolving the Issues of this case.
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ction over a case whik u is under advisement
on appeal 3 Wc have made exceptions to the
rule in the interest of preventing unnecessary
delay, where any action by the trial court is
not likely to modify a party's rights with
respect to the issues raised on appeal Thus in
Peters v Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P 2d 71
(1964), we held that the district court, which
has continuing jurisdiction after entry of a
final divorce decree, may adjudicate a petition
to modify the decree due to a change of circ
umstances while the decree is pending on
appeal since the petition for modification is
collateral to the divorce decree Similarly,
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as
final a judgment against one party in a multiparty action, the remainder of the action
remains in the trial court and is not necessarily
affected by the appeal In that case, the trial j
court has jurisdiction* to proceed with the
claims remaining unadjudicated
Lane v
Messer, 689 P 2d 1333 (Utah 1984)
In the instant case, defendants seek to
reduce the judgment against them by amounts
which they aver have already been paid to
plaintiff4 An adjudication of the motion,
though a modification of the judgment may
result, will not affect the legal issues raised
here with respect to attorney fees and defen
dams' liability Under these circumstances, we
see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while
the district court has the matter under consideration, as that will only delay proceedings
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule
60(b) motion and may deny it without intcrf
erence from this court If the motion is
granted, the trial court in this case need only
advise this court that the judgment has been
modified The district court action granting or
denying the motion and the modified judg
ment should be included in the record when it
is prepared for review by this court
Defendants' motion to stay proceedings and
remand the case to the district court is denied,
and the district court is directed to hear and
determine the rule 60(b) motion
1 Indeed it has been observed that the rule prov
»dcs a "nice balance between the interest In finality
(of judgments] and the desire to achieve justice "
Wright & Miller 11 / edirul Practice and Procedure
§2872(1973)
2 Long v Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F 2d
1310 1318 (9lh Cir 1981)
3 Sec e g Smith v Kufibull, 76 Utah 350, 289 l»
588(1930)
4 Wc of course express no opinion on the merits
of the motion, that being for the trial court to del
ermine
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
Federal Insurance Company,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited
partnership, et a!..
Defendants,
and
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and
Appellant,
v.
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation,
Defendant, Third-Party Defendant, and
Appellee.
No. 8*0388
FILED: June 27, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S Uno
ATTORNEYS:
John P. Ashton, Brian S King, Salt Lake
City, and John A. Kincaid, Jr., John R.
O'Keefe, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
appellant
Jeffrey R Ontt, Robert S Howell, Salt Lake
City, and Mark T. Davenport, Doug T.
Butler, Dallas, Texas, for appellee
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association appeals from a grant of summary judgment In favor of Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation The trial court found that no
genuine issue of materia) fact existed with
regard to Tower Federal Savings and Loan
Association's complaint that Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation owed Tower Federal
Savings and Loan a duty to disclose all record
title Information Wc affirm In part and
reverse in part.
FACTS
On appeal from summary judgment, wc
look at the facts in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. 1
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a Utah
limited partnership, was established to develop
and construct, in Salt Lake County, a retail
shopping mall and warehouse distribution
I center specializing in custom building materI ials Fundina for the project was essentially

cooe«co
Provo U l > h

Culp Construction C >. v. Buildmart Mall
137 Utah

Jv. 8«?, *

pment revenue bonds ("lRBs") in the face ered its defense of the litigation to Lawyers
amount of $7,750,000 First Security Bank of Title under the terms of the title insurance
Utah, N A ("first Security"), acted as inde- policy Lawyers Title accepted the tender of
nture trustee on the IRB loan through its defense subject to a reservation of rights
corporate trust department The deed of trust
First Security initiated nonjudicial foreclosecuring the IRB loan was recorded on Sept
sure proceedings against the project as trustee
ember 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake County under the indenture of trust and, on March
Recorder's office
16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at which First
During the summer of 1984, the principal of Security acquired the project As a result of
the project determined that a funding shortfall the foreclosure proceedings, all hens junior to
of approximately $500,000 existed for the the first hen held by first Security, including
completion of the project Tower Federal the Tower trust deed, were extinguished by
Savings and Loan Association ("Tower") was operation of law Tower and its counsel did
approached by a mortgage broker, Richards- not take any action to stop the foreclosure sale
Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards- or protect its security interest.
Woodbury"), with respect to lending BuildA settlement was reached between all
mart Mall $750,000, secured by a second parties, resulting in the dismissal of all claims
position deed of trust to the project, in order with prejudice, with the exception of the
to complete construction
claims between Tower and Lawyers Title All
Richards-Wood bury retained Lawyers Title outstanding mechanic's liens on the project
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to were released as part of the settlement
provide a commitment for title insurance and
On appeal from summary judgment in favor
issue a title insurance policy. Richmond Title of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that there are
Company ("Richmond Title"), the local agent genuine issues of material fact with respect to
for Lawyers Title, furnished Richards- three causes of action breach of contract,
Woodbury with a commitment for title insu- breach of an implied contractual obligation of
rance that revealed certain encumbrances and good faith and fair dealing, and negligent
hens against the title Richmond Title also misrepresentation
acted as local agent for Lawyers Title in |
writing the subsequent title policy
I. BRFACII OF CONTRACT
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K Woodbury,
acting as agent for Tower, wrote a letter to breached a contractual duty to accurately
Richmond Title delineating escrow instructions report the status of the title at the time the
for the funds to be loaned by Tower Rich- Tower loan was closed The record reveals
mond Title was instructed, among other that the only contractual privity Tower had
things, to deposit the funds into an escrow I with Lawyers Title was the title insurance
account and to release the funds to Buildmart policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title
Mall only when Richmond Title had taken through its local agent, Richmond Title
The essence ol Tower's claim is that as part
steps to "insure that the Trust Deed enclosed
herewith
is in a second lien position behind of the title insurance process, Lawyers Title
(First Security Bank]" and *[t]he only prior issued a commitment for title insuiance to
exceptions to the Trust Deed should be those Richards-Wood bury that was not updated
listed in your Commitment for Title Insur- and upon which Tower relied in making the
ance " In addition, the escrow instructions loan Tower claims that certain mechanic's
directed Richmond that if it was "unable or liens of record v. ere not included as an update
unwilling to promptly follow all of the above to the commitment and that additional hens
referenced instructions," it was to forego dis- would have indicated a "red flag" that the
project was underfunded, which would have
bursement of the funds
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but after caused Tower to decline advancing any loan
the commitment for title insurance ("the funds to Buildmart
Lawyers Title presents three argument* to
commitment") had been issued, numerous
liens appeared of record that were not repo- support summar) judgment on the breach of
rted by Lawyers Title or Richmond Title on contract issue. Its first argument is that the
the commitment Richmond nevertheless dis- only contract it had with Tower was the title
bursed the funds, and the Tower loan was insurance policy itself and that it fulfilled »U
secured by a second deed of trust that was requirements of the policy. Second, Lawyers
recorded on March 20, 1985, in the office of Title argues that the commitment for title
insurance that preceded the title policy was
the Salt Lake County Recorder
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the devel- issued to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower,
oper defaulted on its loan with Tower, as well and therefore no privity existed between
as its obligations under the IRB loan Culp Lawyers Title and Tower with regard to the
Construction Company ("Culp"), the devel- commitment Third, Lawyers Title argues that
oper's primary general contractor, filed a a commitment or preliminary title report is not
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h is first to be observed that Lawyers Iitle
fully and adequately defended Tower's second
lien position as it was obligated (o do by the
terms of the title insurance policy. For that
reason, Tower's cause of action for breach oT
an implied duty of good faith and fajr dealing
or the duty to bargain in good faith is unsupported by the facts. Hence, we affirm the
conclusion of the trial court that no genuine
issue of material fact exists with respect to
breach of the contractual duty of good faith
and fair dealing.*
As to whether a title insurance company is
an abstractor of title, some jurisdictions hold
title insurance companies to .the standard of
liability generally associated with abstractors.3
However, we believe that the better-reasoned
approach is to consider preliminary title
reports and commitments for title insurance as
"no more than a statement of the terms and
conditions upon which the insurer is willing to
issue its title policy ...." 4 Indeed, "{tine prevailing view remains not to impose liability in
tort on a title company. "5
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1-301 (82) (1986
& Supp. 1989) defines title insurance as
the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying of owners of real or
personal property or the holders of
liens or encumbrances on that property, or others interested in the
property against loss or damage
suffered by reason of liens or encumbrances upon, delects in, or the
unmarkctability of the title to the
property, or invalidity or unenforceability of any liens or encumbrances on the property.
It is also to be observed that a duty is
imposed by statute upon title insurers to make
a reasonable search and examination of title
for the purpose of determining insurability.
Utah Code Ann. §31A-20-110(1) (1986)
states in part: "No title insurance policy may
be written until the title insurer or its agent
has conducted a reasonable search and examination of the title and has made a determination of insurability of title under sound
underwriting principles." Nevertheless, even
though section 31 A-20-110(1) imposes a
duty of a reasonable search and examination
for the purpose of determining the insurability
of title, it does not impose a duty to abstract
titles upon title insurance companies.
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah
Code; however, "abstract of title" has been
defined as
(a) condensed history of the title to
land, consisting qf a synopsis or
summary of the material or operative portion of all, the conveyances.
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any estate or Interest therein, together with a statement of all liens,
charges, or liabilities to which the
same may be subject, and of which
is in any way material for purchasers to be apprised. An epitome of
the record evidence of title, including maps, plats, and other aids.6
The function, form, and character of a title
insurer is different from that of an abstractor.
One who hires a title insurance company docs
so.for the purpose of obtaining the assurance
or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in
the chain of title rather than for the purpose
of discovering the title status. A title insurance
company's function is generally confined to
the practice of insurance, not to the practice
of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of its
status as a title insurance company.
II. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The next claim asserted by Tower is that
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond
Title, negligently misrepresented the state of
the title in the commitment for title insurance.
The trial court held that because "negligent
misrepresentation" is a tort claim, it could not
be asserted separately from the breach of
contract claim when the alleged misrepresentation arose out of the contractual relationship
of the parties according to our decision in Beck
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.1
In Deck, an insured brought an action
against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to
settle a claim for insured motorist benefits.
The insured alleged breach of contract, breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. With regard to the emotional distress
tort claim, we held that "in a first-party
relationship between an insurer and its
insured, the duties and obligations of the
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary.
Without more, a breach of those implied or
express duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort."» However,
our holding in Beck does not preclude the
bringing of a tort claim independently of a
contract claim. In Beck, we specifically stated:
"We recognize that in some cases the acts
constituting a breach of contract may also
result in breaches of duty that are independent
of the contract and may give rise to causes of
action in tort."' Statutory requirements that
give rise to independent causes of action under
various unfair practices acts may also give rise
to independent tort actions.10
Negligent misrepresentation occurs *[w]here
one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, is in a superior position to know material
facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a
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suffen loss in that transaction ...." , l FurtheDurham, Justice, having disqualified
rmore, "privity of contract is not a necessary
herself, docs not participate herein; Hillings,
prerequisite to liability."12
Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
In the instant case. Tower asserts a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation because
Lawyers Title provided a commitment for title 1. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah
insurance to Richards-Woodbury, a mort- 1989).
gage broker, with the knowledge that Tower 2. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795,
would rely upon the commitment in making 798 (Utah 1985).
J. Sec, e.g., Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnevot.i.
the loan. Genuine issues of material fact exist
148 An/. 408, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Cl. App
with regard to whether Lawyers Title knew IV85) (title company can be held liable in ion foi iu
that Tower would rely upon the commitment negligence when it holds itself out as a searcher of
in making the loan. Indications of reliance on titles and provides the information for the applicthe commitment may arise from the fact that ants to act upon); McLaughlin v. Attorneys' Title
the title insurance policy was issued to both Guaranty Fund, Inc., 61 111. App. 3d 911, 378
Richards-Woodbury and Tower. In addition, N.E.2d 355, 359 (1978) (when a person seeks title
the escrow instructions given to Lawyers insurance, he expects to obtain a professional title
Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal that the ] search legal opinion as to the condition of title and
a guarantee); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title
loan was contingent upon the status of the
I Co., 220 Kan. 224, 553 P.2d 254, 264-66 (1976)
title remaining the same at the time of closing (where title insurance company held out to the
as it was when the commitment was provided.
I public and assumed to discharge the same duties as
Lawyers Title argues that because a comm- I an individual conveyancer or attorney); Dorr v.
itment is not an abstract of title, Tower could Mass. Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191
not reasonably rely upon it as a comprehensive (1921) (title insurance company held to have acted
statement of the status of the title. We have not merely as a title insurer but also as a paid agent
heretofore concluded that the commitment for in examining the title); Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins.
Co., 218 Neb. 296. 354 N.W.2d 154, 158-59 (1984)
title insurance or a preliminary title report in (when
rendering a title report and issuing a policy, a
this case was not an abstract of title; however, j title insurance company assumes the two distinct
it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent, duties of abstractor and title insurer); Sunset
Richmond Title, may have assumed the duties Holding Corp. v. Home Title Ins. Co., 172 Misc.
and responsibilities of an abstractor when it 759, 16 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1939) (purchaser of realty
received the escrow instructions from Tower's was entitled to recover against title insurance
agent which explicitly directed Richmond not company for negligent examination of title where
to transfer the loan funds unless the title title report was inaccurate on dimensions of propstatus remained the same as stated on the erly).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 237
commitment.
Cal. Rptr. 264, 267 (Cnl. App. 1987) (the California
We hold that summary judgment on the Supreme Court upheld White v. Western Title Ins
issue of negligent misrepresentation was ina- Co., 221 Cal, Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 470 (1986), which
ppropriate because our decision in Beck docs applied abstractor liability to title insurance compnot preclude a separate independent tort. In anies, but court noted that cause of action arose in
addition, material factual issues remain as to the Lawrence case after California legislature had
whether Lawyers Title owed a contractual duty passed a law eliminating abstractor liability for title
to Tower to represent the true status of the I insurance companies); see also Brown's Tie &
title upon receipt and acceptance of the escrow Lumber v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 115 Idaho
56, 764 P.2d 423, 426-27 (1988) (upholding Andinstructions and at all times thereafter when erson and stating that to fall outside of the AndeLawyers Title knew, or in the exercise of rea- rson rule it must be show that abstractor duties were
sonable diligence should have known, of voluntarily assumed); Anderson v. Title Ins. Co.,
additional mechanic's liens against the subject 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82, 86 (1982) (refused to
property. Should it be determined that impose the liabilities of an abstractor upon a title
Lawyers Title owed Tower a duty of disclo- insurance company merely because it issued a prelsure, other questions of material fact also iminary title report); Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co.,
exist, including whether that duty was brea- 89 N.M. 709, 557 P.2d 206, 208 (1976) (no duty of
ched and whether Tower reasonably relied tide insurance company to search records unless
express or implied in the policy).
upon the commitment, thereby defeating a
5. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty
motion for summary judgment.
Co., 116 N.J. 517, 562 A.2d 208,219 (1989).
Remanded for further proceedings consis- 6. Black's Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed. 1979). relattent with this opinion.
ionship of the parties according to our decision in
7. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
WE CONCUR:
8. Id. at 800.
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
9. Id. at 800, n.3 (citing Sams v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
j 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (intentionally causing
Judith M. Billings, Court of Appeals Judge | severe emotional distress to others); Wetherbee v.
United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921. 71 Cal.
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Pfovo Utah
8
uJuiiiL |V, KfD, 8
10 See eg
Utah Code Ann §§13 5 2 5 judgment dismissing its complaint against
(Supp 1989) 76 9 501 lo 509 (1978), 76 10
defendant State of Utah Defendant and
706 lo 708(1978) 76 10 710(1978)
counterclaimant Staker Paving and Constru
11 Sardine v Brunswick Corp, 18 Utah 2d 378, etion appeals the grant of summary judgment
381, 423 P 2d 659, 662 (1967) sec also Pncc-Orem entered in favor of the State dismissing
In vest mem Co v Rollins, Brown & Cunnell, 713 Staker's counterclaim against the State
P 2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986) Restatement (Second) of
Torts §552 (1965)
I. FACTS
12 Price Orem 713 P 2d at 59, Chnstenson v
Christensen & Griffith contracted with
Commonwealth land Title Ins Co 666 P 2d 302 Provo City to construct the East Bay Golf
307 (Utah 1983)
Course Construction of the golf course began
in mid-March of 1984 At approximately jhe
same time, the State began building two dikes
running parallel to and along both sides of
Cue as
Interstate 15 ("1-15"), the major freeway
137 Utah Adv Rep 8
running north and south through Provo. To
the east of 1-15 lies a range of mountains
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Runoff water drains from the mountains and
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
flows westward toward Utah Lake, which lies
to the west of 1-15
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a municipal
The East Bay Golf Course is located immcorporation of the State of Utah, and
ediately east of 1-15, between the mountains
Christensen & Griffith Construction
and the freeway. At this location, the roadbed
Company,
on which 1-15 lies acts as a dam or dike,
Plaintiffs,
stopping the flow of water from the mountv
ains toward the lake. Because of this condiSTATE OF UTAH, by an (J through ill
tion, several culverts were constructed underDepartment of Transportation,
neath 1-15 to allow water to flow unimpeded
Defendant and Appellee,
to Utah Lake
and
As part of the State's diking project in
Staker Paving and Construction Company,
1984, the culverts under 1-15 had to be extDefendant and Appellant.
ended to run under the new dikes. To facilitate the culvert extension, the State's contraChristensen St Griffith Construction
ctor, Staker Paving, built coffer dams. These
Company, and Provo City Corporation, a
coffer dams were mounds of earth built
municipal corporation of the State of Utah,
around the culverts and the areas into which
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
the culverts would be extended The water
v
trapped behind the coffer dams was pumped
State of Utah, by and through Its Department
out to create a dry area in which the extens
of Transportation, and Staker Paving and
ions on the ends of the culverts could be built
Construction Company,
However, with the coffer dams in place, the
Defendants and Appellee
water could not flow through the culverts
toward Utah Lake.
No 880083
Christensen & Griffith alleges that the State
FILED: June 27, 1990
and Staker negligently allowed the coffer dams
to remain in place after Staker's project was
Fourth District Utah County
completed, thus damming the water and
Honorable Ray M Harding
causing the water level on the east side of IATTORNEYS
15 to rise. Christensen & Griffith alleges
Bruce L Richards, Salt Lake City, for
further that this caused flooding in the area of
Christensen & Griffith Construction
construction of the golf course. Christensen &
Onffith complains that this made their work
Gary Gregcrson, Provo, for Provo City
much more difficult. The work was slowed
Carman E Kipp, Salt Lake City, for State of
because of the necessity to work in water, the
Utah and UDOT
need to use draglines instead of backhoes, and
Robert H Henderson Sail Lake City, for
the need to move material twice.
Staker Paving
Plaintiffs Provo City and Christensen &
Griffith originally filed this action on May 13,
This opinion li subject to revision before
1985 The State filed un answer and crosspublication In the Pacific Reporter.
claim against its contractor Staker. Staker
filed an answer to the original complaint and
STEWART, Justice
to the State's cross-claim and also filed a
Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construe-
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Staker based on an argument that the State immunity *) Christensen & Griffith argues that
was immune from suit for flood related the second paragraph should be read to
activities under a 1984 amendment to Utah provide only a qualified immunity for flood
Code Ann §63-30-3. The State's motion control activities, which would make the
was granted as to both of plaintiffs' claims immunity subject to the waiver provisions
and as to Staker's counterclaim Provo City (This argument is hereinafter referred to as the
and Christensen & Griffith independently argument for "qualified immunity ") The
appealed the grant of summary judgment in central issue in this case is the choice between
favor of the State The appeal of Provo City these two positions
was dismissed after it settled out of court with
the State Staker also appealed the grant of B / egislative History
The amendment adding the second paragsummary judgment in favor of the State
I raph to §63-30 3 was enacted in 1984 as
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
part of Senate Bill No. 97, entitled "Flood
A grant of summary judgment is appropr- Relief-1984 " 1984 Utah Laws ch 33. §1
iate only where there is no genuine issue of This governmental immunity amendment was
material fact and the moving party is entitled only a small part of a larger act which provto judgment as a matter of law Utah R. Civ
ided for various actions by different state
P. 56(c); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt agencies to respond to recent flooding and
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 773 P 2d 1382, expected flooding Senator Finlinson, the
1385 (Utah 1989) When we review a trial Senate sponsor of the bill, discussed the
court's grant of summary judgment, we purpose of the amendment to §63-30-3 on
analyze the facts and inferences in the light the Senate floor.
most favorable to the losing party. Copper
And what we're really trying to do
State Leasing Co v Blacker Appliance &
is encourage the public sector to
Furniture Co , 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988)
take action to prevent damage Salt
We review the trial court's conclusions of law
Lake City is probably one of the,
for correctness Madsen v Borthick, 769 P 2d
and the Salt Lake County program
245, 247 (Utah 1988)
with the trerriendous effort they did
t h r o u g h their flood c o n t r o l
III ANALYSIS
program It did cost money but
A. Statute
they saved, you know, millions of
Utah Code Ann §63-30-3 (1989) prov- i
dollars worth of damage to the
ides as follows:
private sector and we want them to
Except as may be otherwise probe able to make good decisions
vided in this chapter, all governmrelative to flood control without
ental entities are immune from suit
worrying about somebody coming
for any injury which results from
back and suing [them] less [sic] and
the exercise of a governmental tunc
second guessing [them] m that very
tion,
governmentally-owned
situation
hospital, nursing home, or other
1984 Senate Bill No 97, Day 20 (Saturday,
governmental health care facility,
January 28, 1984, afternoon session)
and from an approved medical,
(emphasis added) This statement indicates
nursing, or other professional
that in enacting this amendment, the legislahealth care clinical training program
ture intended to encourage governmental entconducted in cither public or private
ities to take action to prevent damage from
facilities
expected flooding
The management of flood waters
Senator Fmlinson's statement is consistent
and other natural disasters and the
| with either an absolute or a qualified immuconstruction, repair, and operation
nity interpretation of §63-30-3 The statof flood and storm systems by
ement is consistent with the qualified immugovernmental entities are considered
nity interpretation because Senator Finlinson
to be governmental functions, and
stated that the legislature wanted public sector
governmental entities and their
decision-makers to be able to make decisions
officers are immune from suit for
relating to flood control without worrying
any injury or damage resulting from
about someone "second guessing" them This
those activities
purpose is met by classifying flood control
(Emphasis added ) The State argues that the activities as "governmental functions " If
immunity granted for flood control manage- flood control is classified as a "governmental
ment is absolute and not subject to the waivers function," a governmental entity would be
of immunity provided in sections 63-30-5 liable for ordinary negligence committed in
through 63-30-10 5 of the Governmental flood control activities, but would not necesCODE •Co
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